Pre-Grant Publication Number: 20100246827
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Prior Art Detail
Summary / Description
| Summary / Description | This paper gives a scheme to ensure secrecy of previously encrypted messages even if the decryption keys are leaked at some point in the future. The construction makes clever use of the key hierarchy in hierarchical identity-based encryption schemes. |
Basic Information
| Type of Prior Art | Online Publication |
| URL | http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/083... |
| Author/Creator | Ran Canetti, Shai Halevi, Jonathan Katz |
| Title | A Forward-Secure Public-Key Encryption Scheme |
| Publication Date | December 23, 2003 |
| Publisher | EUROCRYPT 2003 |
| Directions to Document Location | |
| Additional Information | pages 255-271 |
Notes / To Do
| Notes | Prior art identified by Gregory Neven, IBM, and submitted by Diane Willis. |
Excerpt
Excerpt Abstract
Cryptographic computations are often carried out on insecure devices for which the threat
of key exposure represents a serious and realistic concern. In an e*ffort to mitigate the damage caused by exposure of secret keys stored on such devices, the paradigm of forward security was introduced. In a forward-secure scheme, secret keys are updated at regular periods of time; exposure of the secret key corresponding to a given time period does not enable an adversary to \break" the scheme (in the appropriate sense) for any prior time period. A number of constructions of forward-secure digital signature schemes, key-exchange protocols, and symmetric-key schemes are known.
We present the *first non-trivial constructions of (non-interactive) forward-secure public-key encryption schemes. Our main construction achieves security against chosen-plaintext attacks under the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the standard model. This scheme is practical, and all parameters grow at most logarithmically with the total number of time periods. We also give a slightly more efficient scheme in the random oracle model. Both our schemes can be extended to achieve security against chosen-ciphertext attacks and to support an unbounded number of time periods.
Toward our goal, we introduce the notion of binary tree encryption and show how to construct a binary tree encryption scheme in the standard model. This new primitive may be of independent interest. In particular, we use it to construct the *first known example of a (hierarchical) identity-based encryption scheme that is secure in the standard model. |
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