Pre-Grant Publication Number: 20110093714
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Prior Art Detail
Summary / Description
| Summary / Description | Description of the IBM 4764 Cryptographic Coprocessor |
Basic Information
| Type of Prior Art | Online Publication |
| URL | http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM... |
| Author/Creator | IBM Advanced Cryptographic Hardware Development |
| Title | IBM eServer Cryptographic Coprocessor Security Module, Model 4764-001 |
| Publication Date | August 29, 2007 |
| Publisher | |
| Directions to Document Location | |
| Additional Information | |
Notes / To Do
| Notes | Prior art suggested by Todd Arnold, IBM, and submitted by Diane Willis. |
Excerpt
Excerpt 3 Secure Coprocessor Overview
A multi-chip embedded product, the module is intended to be a high-end secure coprocessor: a device—with a
general-purpose computation environment and high-performance crypto support—that executes software and retains
secrets, despite most foreseeable physical or logical attack. Customers can use this secure platform as a foundation
for their own secure applications, which may range from crypto APIs to digital media distribution.
Authenticating the Configuration Verifying that one is interacting with an untampered device operating the
correct software is necessary for both classes of applications:
• Standalone devices, such as cryptographic accelerators. Research results show that if a user cannot verify
that their crypto box is both untampered, and operating the intended software, then their entire cryptographic
operation is threatened. For example, a hostile, card-resident adversary can replace the key generation algorithm
with one that appears to behave completely correctly and “randomly”—except the adversary can learn all the
keys.
• Distributed applications. Many e-commerce scenarios require that one party be able to trust computation
that occurs at a remote site, which is under the physical control of a party who may benefit from tampering
with this computation. See Fig. 1.
The module provides full outbound authentication (“OA”) for all layers of software: a card-resident, non-exportable
private key can sign everything output from the module. OA features are integral to Segments 1 and 2; Segment 3 entities (applications) may access OA services through an exposed Segment 2 interface. |
Relevance
Claims
1
Relevance
IBM 4764 Cryptographic Coprocessor cards is an example of IBM's family of Cryptographic Coprocessors. Several generations (4758, 4764, 4765) work essentially the same way. The card plugs into the bus in a computer server - anything from a PC to a mainframe. The card is the "accessory" and the server as the "device". The cards have RSA key pairs securely stored in them, and there is a way to ask the card to sign data it contains and send the signed data out to the server. The server has a copy of the public key needed to verify that signature, and by doing so it verifies that the card is authentic and can be trusted and used.
IBM 4764 Cryptographic Coprocessor cards is an example of IBM's family of Cryptographic Coprocessors. Several generations (4758, 4764, 4765) work essentially the same way. The card plugs into the bus in a computer server - anything from a PC to a mainframe. The card is the "accessory" and the server as the "device". The cards have RSA key pairs securely stored in them, and there is a way to ask the card to sign data it contains and send the signed data out to the server. The server has a copy of the public key needed to verify that signature, and by doing so it verifies that the card is authentic and can be trusted and used.
Claim Chart
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6
Relevance
See the Relevance in Claim 1: The card can be viewed as the "accessory" and the server as the "device", along the lines of this Claim which says it can be "a computer device and a peripheral device".
See the Relevance in Claim 1: The card can be viewed as the "accessory" and the server as the "device", along the lines of this Claim which says it can be "a computer device and a peripheral device".
Claim Chart
Some
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